

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

5 January 1962

25X1

Copy No. ~~✓~~ 10

CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN



25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100360001-4

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100360001-4

5 January 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

25X1

25X1

4. Lebanon: Continued widespread arrests by Lebanese Army could create new political crisis. (Page iv)

7. Congo: Tshombé sees Kitona accords as possible basis of agreement with Leopoldville. (Page v)

8. Kenya: Rivalry between Mboya and Kenyatta threatens orderly political development. (Page vi)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100360001-4

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100360001-4

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 January 1962

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

i

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Lebanon: [The thoroughness with which the Lebanese Army is mopping up after the abortive coup attempt of 31 December could cause a political crisis.] 25X1

25X1

[In addition to members of the Social National party, which instigated the coup attempt, other people suspected of connections with ex-President Shamun and the British are being taken into custody.] 25X1

25X1

[Although the coup itself was devoid of religious issues, the army's actions could arouse extremist Christian, Druze, and Moslem political elements.] 25X1

25X1


25X1

5 Jan 62


DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1



*The numerical strength of Tshombe's forces in the Elisabethville area has been reduced in the recent fighting, but there are no reliable figures on the number of casualties.



Congo: In a moderate speech to the Katanga assembly on 4 January, Tshombé indicated that he regards the Kitona accords as a possible basis for an agreement with Adoula's central government. In balking at two provisions of the eight-point protocol, however, he left himself free to continue to press for a loose Congo confederation. Points which Tshombé characterized as "causing trouble" were those which stressed the applicability throughout the Congo of the central government's Belgian-drafted constitution, and which called upon Tshombé to "facilitate the implementation" of UN resolutions concerning the Congo. Tshombé advised the assembly that it should decide "up to what point we can make concessions." Senior Katangan officials reportedly expect the assembly, without formally ratifying the accord, to approve Tshombé's actions to date and to call for further negotiations with Leopoldville.

25X1

25X1

5 Jan 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

25X1

Kenya: A struggle between Tom Mboya and Jomo Kenyatta for dominance in the Kenya African National Union (KANU), Kenya's largest African party, seems to be coming to a head.

Kenyatta is infuriated by recent criticisms of him by Mboya supporters. He reportedly feels Mboya is the only major threat to his control of the party.

Kenyatta has identified himself completely with KANU's Communist-financed, ex - Mau Mau extremists. He added that he considered a KANU split likely, probably during the constitutional conference which begins on 14 February in London. Kenyatta's prestige is committed in an effort to rescue KANU from its factionalism. Should KANU break up, the tribal rivalry which has been a basic but partly hidden factor in Kenya politics probably would come into the open, and internal stability and orderly political development would be jeopardized.

25X1

25X1

25X1

SELECTED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

25X1

Outlook for Cyprus over the next few years: an estimate of communal affairs, political outlook, economic prospects, and foreign relations. U.S.I.B. NIE 29.3-61. Dec 28 '61.

25X1

5 Jan 62

DAILY BRIEF

vi

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

The Situation in the Congo

The US Consulate reported on 3 January that most impartial observers in Elisabethville regard Tshombé as "trying to move along the path outlined at Kitona." While denouncing the circumstances of the Kitona meeting, Tshombé nevertheless has carried out a provision which called for Katanga to send representatives to a conference in Leopoldville to discuss constitutional revision.

In characterizing only two points of the Kitona protocol as troublesome, Tshombé implied a willingness to accept others which would put an end to Katanga's claim to independence. These included provisions underscoring the "indivisible unity" of the Congo and recognizing President Kasavubu as chief of state. Other points to which Tshombé failed to take specific exception included a provision for placing the Katanga army under Kasavubu's authority, and a clause in which Tshombé recognized the authority of the central government throughout the Congo. Tshombé's apparent emphasis on constitutional revision recalls past pronouncements in which he indicated a willingness to drop Katanga's claim to independence in return for a loose Congo confederation.

In Leopoldville there continues to be sentiment in the national assembly for censure action against Adoula's recalcitrant vice premier, Antoine Gizenga. On 2 January, two Leopoldville politicians indicated to US Embassy officers that the Chamber of Deputies had voted overwhelmingly in favor of action against Gizenga, with only Gizenga's own African Solidarity party (PSA) providing him with firm backing. A formal censure move is expected shortly.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Factionalism Among Kenya African Nationalists

KANU is the party of the Kikuyu and Luo tribes, which are the two most articulate of the colony's African groups and include 2,500,000 of the 6,000,000 Kenya Africans. The party won an overwhelming majority of the votes in legislative elections last February, but has never participated in the government because a number of its demands were not met by the colonial authorities.

KANU's effectiveness has constantly been impaired by factionalism. Disputes revolve around three issues: the basic Kikuyu-Luo cleavage; the activities of KANU's left wing, which unites ex - Mau Mau "old guard" Kikuyu leaders with Oginga Odinga, a Luo extremist who serves as a channel for funds from the Sino-Soviet bloc; and the ambition and [] of Tom Mboya, who is also a Luo.

When Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, assumed the KANU presidency last October, he committed himself to a reorganization and revitalization of the party. He has been unable to accomplish this, however, and instead has gravitated into the congenial and lucrative company of Odinga and the "old guard" Kikuyu.

The factions are continuing their maneuvering;

Even if the break does not become open, however, KANU factionalism seems certain to increase between now and the constitutional conference. Tribal clashes reflecting the political []

25X1

25X6

25X6

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] tension are already on the increase, and these, added to the inability of the African politicians to come to any agreement, could delay Kenya's timetable for independence.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

 Special Counsel to the President

 Military Representative of the President

 The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

 The Scientific Adviser to the President

 The Director of the Budget

 The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

 The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

 The Secretary of State

 The Under Secretary of State

 The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

 The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

 The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

 The Secretary of the Treasury

 The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

 The Secretary of Defense

 The Deputy Secretary of Defense

 The Secretary of the Army

 The Secretary of the Navy

 The Secretary of the Air Force

 The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

 The Assistant Secretary of Defense

 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

 Chief of Staff, United States Army

 Commandant, United States Marine Corps

 U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

 Commander in Chief, Pacific

 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

 The Director, The Joint Staff

 The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

 The Attorney General

 The Federal Bureau of Investigation

 The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

 The Chairman

The National Security Agency

 The Director

The United States Information Agency

 The Director

The National Indications Center

 The Director

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100360001-4

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/11/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006100360001-4